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The purpose of this article is to familiarize the practitioner with
a curious twist in Louisiana mineral law: the imprescriptible mineral
interest in land. Such interests are an exception to the Louisiana
system of prescriptible mineral interests; a system founded on a
public policy which fosters the early return of the severed mineral
right to the title from which it emanated.' Imprescriptible mineral
servitudes may be created in two ways: (a) by a reservation of the
mineral rights in a sale to the state or federal government or any
other entity with the power to expropriate, or (b) by a sale of land
from the state into private ownership. Each method will be dealt
with separately. First, however, a brief review of general principles
of Louisiana mineral law is necessary to aid in understanding im-
prescriptible mineral interests.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW
With limited exception, Louisiana law does not permit the crea-
tion of a mineral estate distinct from and independent of the full
title to the land.' A landowner who sells or reserves the minerals in
his property merely creates a mineral servitude, which is defined as
the "right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose
of exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to pos-
session and ownership."' A mineral right is considered a real right
and incorporeal immovable which may be freely transferred as an
item of commerce. If not used within ten years from the date of its
creation, the mineral servitude will lapse by virtue of liberative
prescription and return to the title out of which it was created.'
B.S.. Tulane University; J.D., Tuiane University; Member, Louisiana Bar
Association. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Mr. Bill
Watkins in the preparation of this article.
1. See generally Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (1940); Bodcaw
Lumber Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 167 La. 847, 120 So. 389 (1929).
2. E.g., Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
3. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:21 (1974).
4. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:27 (1974); e.g., Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sal-
ling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
Although a mineral servitude cannot last for over ten years without
use,. it may be created for an express term of less than ten years in
which case it will lapse upon expiration of that term, irrespective of
use which would otherwise be sufficient to keep it alive.' Contracts
attempting to avoid or extend the ten-year prescriptive period have
been refused enforcement as violative of public policy! Once the
5. The use sufficient to avoid the accrual of the ten year prescription of non-use
is defined in LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:29 (1974) as the commencement of good faith
operations undertaken for the discovery and production of the minerals which are the
subject of the servitude. If the servitude is to be preserved by the drilling of a well in
search of oil and gas, the well, once commenced, must additionally be drilled in good
faith to a depth at which there is a reasonable expectation of commercial production.
LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:29 (1974). The prescription of non-use may also be inter-
rupted by voluntary acknowledgment in writing by the owner of the land burdened by
the servitude. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:54 (1974). Such acknowledgment, however,
can only waive prescription which has accrued as of the date that the acknowledgment
is executed.
If the servitude reserved encompasses all minerals, and not just oil and gas, the
use of the servitude with respect to any such mineral will preserve the servitude in its
entirety as to all minerals, including oil and gas. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S..31:40 (1974).
For example, if commercial gravel deposits existed on the area covered by the mineral
servitude, the utilization of the servitude for purposes of removing gravel would
preserve the servitude as to all other minerals covered by the servitude as created.
Unit operations conducted on lands other than the lands burdened by the servitude
will interrupt prescription on the servitude only as to that part of the servitude tract.
which is included within the boundaries of the unit, unless the parties expressly pro-
vide that such off-premises unit operations will interrupt prescription as to the entirety
of the servitude, both inside and outside of the unit. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:72
& 75 (1974).
6. See, e.g., LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:25 & 27(4) (1974). See Texas Co. v.
.Crawford, 212 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1954); Leiter Minerals Inc. v. California Co., 241 La.
915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961).
7. See, e.g., Ober v. McGinty, 66 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 2d Cir. (1953)). (A mineral
reservation in a sale which gave an option to renew a mineral servitude after ten
years upon payment of a fixed price was held to be an attempt to evade the law of
prescription; enforcement of the contract was refused.). Several cases, however, have
endorsed a limited extension of the ten year prescriptive period by utilization of op-
tions to purchase at a future date incorporated into the terms of a long-term lease or
other option agreement. See generally Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 35 So. 2d 219
(1948); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Ayer Timber Co., 131 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961); LA. R.S. 31",28 (1974). The principal case in this area is Chicago MiU &
Lumber Co. v. Ayer Timber Co., supra, in which the landowner granted several or-
dinary leases with an option to the lessee to purchase the property at the end of the
stipulated five year term of the lease, with the understanding that the sale would be
subject to a mineral reservation at the time of the execution of the sale document. The
original lease/option agreements provided that the minerals would remain in the land-
owner during the terms of the leases. The lessee subsequently exercised its option at
the end of the five year terms of the leases. The minerals were reserved in the acts of
sale executed in implementation of the option agreements, and minerals were ultimately
discovered on the property more than ten years after the original lease/option
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mineral servitude prescribes, the right to explore for and produce
minerals returns to the owner of the land. The expectancy of a land-
owner in the extinction of an outstanding mineral servitude cannot
be conveyed or reserved directly or indirectly.' This expectancy is
not a vested right. Thus a change in a prescriptive period, being
remedial, does not interfere with substantive rights and may be ap-
plied retroactively without running afoul of the Constitution.'
A lesser interest in minerals than the servitude is the mineral
royalty, defined as "the right to participate in production of
minerals from land owned by another or land subject to a mineral
servitude owned by another." 10 The mineral royalty interest is also
subject to a similar, though not identical, ten year prescription of
non-use." Understanding these principles facilitates an appreciation
of the problems created by statutes which render mineral interests
imprescriptible.
MINERAL RESERVATIONS IN SALES TO EXPROPRIATING BODIES
Privately-owned imprescriptible mineral interests in Louisiana
date back to the Great Depression. During the 1930's, federal and
state governments increased the number of public projects. which re-
quired the acquisition of land. Obviously, landowners in states
where mineral estates of unlimited duration separate from the fee
could be reserved were willing to convey their property to the gov-
ernment for less compensation than a Louisiana landowner whose
mineral reservation might endure for only ten years without use.,
agreements, but less than ten years after the actual transfer of the lands to the lessee
pursuant to the exercise of its option to purchase. The plaintiff, who was the current
surface owner, argued that the lease/option agreements were designed to circumvent
the public policy providing the foundation* for the rule of liberative prescription ap-
plicable to mineral servitudes, but the court of appeal on rehearing held that prescrip-
tion did not begin to run until the servitude was actually created upon the execution
of the sale and the reservation of the minerals. Accordingly, the servitude was deemed
preserved by the use which occurred within ten years from the date that the option
had been executed.
8. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:76 (1974). See Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d
322 (1954).
9. See also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945). See, e.g., United
States v. Nebo Oil Co.. 190 F.2d 1003 (6th Cir. 1951).
10. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:80 (1974).
11. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:85 (1974).
12. Currier, The 1958 Louisiana Statutes On Liberative Prescription Of Mineral
Interests, 34 TUL. L. REv. 51 (1959); Comment. Imprescriptible Mineral Reservations
In Sales Of Land To The State And Federal Government, 22 TUL. L. REv. 496 (1948).
13. United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 90 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. La. 1950), off'd, 190 F.2d
1003 (5th Cir. 1951); Currier, supra note 12; Comment, aupra note 12.
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As a result of these developments, the fairness of Louisiana's
system of prescriptible mineral servitudes was questioned.' In
response to these problems the Louisiana legislature enacted Acts
68 and 151 of 1938, which made certain mineral reservations in land
acquisitions by the state or federal government imprescriptible."5
These statutes required a determination of the purpose for which the
land was acquired in order to determine whether a mineral reservation
in the act of acquisition was imprescriptible.' These Acts were
repealed by Act 315 of 1940, which provided that prescription would
not run against minerals reserved in sales to the federal govern-
ment. Act 315 did not apply to land sales to the state government. 7
14. Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude And Royalty Doctrines: A Report
To The Mineral Law Committee Of The Louisiana State Law Institute, 26 TUL. L.
REv. 172, 191 (1952).
15. Id. 1938 La. Acts, No. 68, §§ 1, 2, provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, That whenever land
situated in any spillway or floodway is sold to or acquired by the United States or
the State of Louisiana, or any subdivisions or agencies thereof, for use in the con-
struction, operation or maintenance of any spillway or floodway constructed,
operated or maintained under authority of the Acts of Congress of May 15th,
1928, June 15, 1936, or June 22, 1936 (Flood Control Act), as amended, or as
hereafter amended, or under authority of any other Act or Acts of Congress, and
the owner of said land reserves or retains the mineral rights or the rights in and
to the minerals in said land, said rights shall be imprescriptible.
Section 2. That all laws or parts of laws, general or special, as are inconsistent
or in conflict herewith, be, and the same are, hereby repealed.
1938 La. Acts, No. 151, §§ 1, 2, provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, That when real estate
is acquired by the United States of America, the State of Louisiana, or any of its
subdivisions from any person, firm or corporation for use in any public work
and/or improvement, and, by the act of acquisition, oil, gas and/or other minerals
or royalties are reserved, prescription shall not run against such reservation of
said oil, gas and/or other minerals or royalties.
Section 2. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith be, and the same
are, hereby repealed.
16. Act 68, supra note 15, related only to lands acquired for use in connection
with spillway or floodway projects, and Act 151, supra note 15, related to lands ac-
quired for public works or improvement.
17. LA. R.S. 9:5806 (1950) (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1974 La. Acts, No.
50, § 3). 1940 La. Acts, No. 315, §§ 1, 2, provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana, That when land is ac-
quired by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or expropriation pro-
ceedings by the United States of America, or any of its subdivisions or agencies,
from any person, firm or corporation, and by the act of acquisition, verdict or
judgment, oil, gas, and/or other minerals or royalties are reserved, or the land so
acquired is by the act of acquisition conveyed subject to a prior sale or reserva-
tion of oil, gas and/or other minerals or royalties, still in force and effect, said
rights so reserved or previously sold shall be imprescriptible.
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The enactment and repeal of the 1938 Acts raise questions of retro-
activity which could result in litigation. Thus a few remarks con-
cerning their impact are in order.
In Whitney National Bank v. Little Creek Oil Co., '" Act 315 of
1.940 was applied retroactively to render imprescriptible a mineral
servitude created in 1932. Such retroactive application of Act 315 of
1940 was held constitutional in United States v. Nebo Oil Co. 9 For
the same reasons that statutes which affect prescription are applied
retroactively without violating the Constitution," the provisions of
the 1938 Acts would probably also be held retroactive. Thus, a
mineral servitude created in 1929 on land which was sold to the
state or federal government in 1935, for example, might be rendered
imprescriptible by either Act 68 or 151 of 1938. However, if both the
1938 Acts and the 1940 Acts are to be applied retroactively, certain
problems may arise.
For example, a mineral reservation in a sale to the state in 1935,
first rendered imprescriptible by the Acts of 1938, might then be
rendered prescriptible by Act 315 of 1940, since the 1940 Act only
applied to land sales to the federal government. The difficult ques-
tion to answer in this situation is whether any effect at all should be
given to the Acts of 1938, in the form of either an interruption or
suspension of prescription. While no decision has addressed this
precise question, some cases indicate a tendency to take limited ac-
count of repealed prescriptive statutes in computing the running of
prescription under a new prescriptive statute. For instance, the doc-
trine of proportionate prescription could be applied to give the 1938
Acts the effect of a continuing interruption of prescription until Act
315 of 1940 took effect.2 This doctrine is applied as follows: "[I]f two
years have run against a right under a ten year prescriptive statute
at a time when the statute is changed to twenty years, prescription
is 1/5 accrued under the old statute and the remaining 4/5 are com-
puted under the new statute (16 years) instead of 18 years which
would remain if the old statute were ignored entirely."' Application
Section 2. That Act 68 and Act 151 of 1938 and all other laws or parts of laws,
general or special, in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.
Note that Section 1 of this statute only applied to the federal government.
18. 212 La. 949, 33 So. 2d 693 (1947).
19. 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951).
20. See notes 9 & 19, supra and accompanying text.
21. See Whitworth v. Ferguson. 18 La. Ann. 602 (1866); Xanpi v. Orso, 11 La. 57
(1837); Goddard's Heirs v. Urquhart, 6 La. 659 (1834).
22. Comment. supra note 12. at 503 n.45.
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of this rule to the two years period while Acts 68 and 151 of 1938
were in effect would give the following results: (1) No prescription
would accrue during the two-year period; (2) Prescription accruing
before the 1938 Acts would be interrupted, thus; (3) The ten-year
prescription would begin to run anew when Act 315 of 1940 took ef-
fect." Alternatively, a court could say the existence of the act was
an obstacle to prescription which did not eliminate prescription
already accrued but simply suspended it to be renewed when the Act
was repealed.2' Thus, a mineral interest created in 1935 would pre-
scribe for non-use in 1947. Or finally, a court could hold that the
Acts of 1938 had no impact at all, and our hypothetical mineral ser-
vitude, created in 1935, would simply prescribe in 1945 from ten
years non-use. Louisiana courts have provided no firm answer to
this question.
Statutes of limitation in effect when a contract is executed are
not fictitiously considered a part of the contract because the parties
are presumed to have known that the limitation period might be
changed." Thus, mineral reservations made in sales to the state be-
tween 1938 and 1940 should not be treated any differently than a re-
servation made in a year prior to the 1938 Acts. However, one author
has argued that mineral reservations made between 1938 and 1940
may not have been rendered prescriptible by Act 315 of 1940 be-
cause the 1938 Acts were expressed "in such positive terms as to
negate the usual presumption that the parties knew that the statu-
tory remedial period for exercising the mineral royalty or servitude
might be changed."'" In the final analysis, mineral reservations in
sales to the federal government as far back as 1928 would remain
imprescriptible; similar reservations in sales to the state govern-
ment would probably have prescribed for non-use by 1951.
The most recent interpretation of Act 315 of 1940 came in
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.27 In that case the
United States Supreme Court was faced with a mineral servitude
for an express ten-year term created by acquisitions of land in 1937
and 1939 by the United States pursuant to the Migratory Bird Con-
servation Act. The mineral servitude owner argued that his interest
had been rendered imprescriptible by Act 315 of 1940. The federal
23. Id
24. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31;149 (1974), comment. See generally Sabine River
Auth. v. Salter, 184 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951).
26. Comment, supra note 12, at 502.
27. 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
[Vol. 42
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government argued that the mineral servitude was for an express
term and retroactive application of Act 315 would impair the obliga-
tions of the contract. Both sides relied upon an earlier decision by
the Louisiana Supreme Court, Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co.,"'
in which the Louisiana court indicated that Act 315 was not ap-
plicable to a mineral servitude for a fixed duration. The Leiter
court, however, did hint broadly that under Louisiana law, a mineral
reservation similar to the one at issue in Little Lake was not for a
fixed duration. However, in Little Lake, the United States Supreme
Court refused to follow "hostile state law" which frustrated con-
tracts made by the United States pursuant to Congressional policy.
The Court held that federal law was to govern the construction of
the contract, and, finding the reservation to be for an express term,
refused to apply Act 315 retroactively on the grounds that to do so
would be an unconstitutional impairment of contract rights.2 From
this holding, one may conclude that Act 315 is inapplicable when the
mineral reservation is made in a sale to the federal government and
is for an express term. Conversely, when the reserved servitude is
for an unlimited or unspecified duration, the rationale of Little Lake
Misere should not apply, and a servitude should have become impre-
scriptible upon the passage of Act 315 of 1940.
Between 1940 and 1958, no statute of general application existed
which made mineral reservations in sales to the state or its agencies
imprescriptible. However, mineral reservations in acquisitions by
the State Parks Commission of Louisiana were rendered imprescrip-
tible by virtue of Act 8 of an extra session of the Louisiana legisla-
ture in 1942." In 1950 a forty year prescriptive period was established
for mineral reservations in land acquisitions for the Anacoco-Prairie
State Game and Fish Preserve.3'
Act 315 of 1940 became section 5806 of Title 9 of the 1950 Loui-
siana Revised Statutes. This statute was amended and reenacted by
the legislature in 1958, when another paragraph was added to make
mineral reservations in sales to certain state agencies imprescripti-
ble."2 This latter paragraph reintroduced the concept of imprescripti-
28. 241 La. 915. 132 So. 2d 845 (1961).
29. 412 U.S. at 604.
30. 1942 La. Acts, Ex. Sess., No. 8, § 1.
31. 1950 La. Acts, No. 169, § 1.
32. 1958 La. Acts, No. 278, §§ 1, 2. This Act read as follows:
(A) When land is acquired by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or ex-
propriation proceedings by the United States of America, or any of its subdivi-
sions or agencies, from any person, firm or corporation, and by the act of acquisi-
tion, order or judgment, oil, gas or other minerals or royalties are reserved, or
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ble mineral interests reserved in sales to certain state agencies. The
State of Louisiana itself was not mentioned in section 5806 of Title 9
as amended in 1958, nor were certain state agencies or subdivisions,
such as municipalities. In 1960, paragraph B of section 5806 was
amended to include "any political subdivision authorized to incur
debt and issue bonds under the provisions of the Constitution and
statutes of the State of Louisiana, heretofore or hereafter created or
established by the State of Louisiana. . ... ,1 This amendment was
probably sufficient to include municipalities. In Humble Oil & Refin-
ing Co. v. Freeland," the third circuit held that the Board of Super-
visors of Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical
College fell within the scope of paragraph B of section 5806. The
court applied this act retroactively to hold that a mineral reserva-
tion in a sale to the Board on December 30, 1948, was imprescripti-
ble because Act 278 of 1958 became effective on July 30, 1958,
the land so acquired is by the act of acquisition conveyed subject to a prior sale
or reservation of oil, gas or other minerals or royalties, still in force and effect,
the rights so reserved or previously sold shall be imprescriptible.
(B) When land is acquired by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or ex-
propriation proceedings by the State Department of Highways, the State Depart-
ment of Public Works, or by any of the several levee districts in the state, or by
the State Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, or by a police jury, school district,
school board or other board or by any commission, heretofore or hereafter
created or established by the State of Louisiana, from any person, firm or cor-
poration, and by the act of acquisition, order or judgment, oil, gas or other
mineral or royalties are reserved, the rights so reserved ihall be imprescriptible
and shall remain vested in the person, firm or corporation from whom the land
was acquired, condemned or expropriated, or in the heirs or assigns of that per-
son, firm or corporation; provided, however, that should the ownership of such
land pass i'nto private hands, the prescription of non-use provided by R.C.C.
Arts. 789 and 3546 shall apply as in the usual case, or the land so acquired is by
the act of acquisition conveyed subject to a prior sale or reservation of oil, gas or
other minerals or royalties, still in force and effect, the rights so reserved or
previously sold shall prescribe for non-use by the owner thereof, but such rights
shall revert to the owner of the land at the time of its acquisition, condemnation
or expropriation by the state governmental agency, or to said owner's heirs or
assigns, rather than to the owner of the expropriated land at the time of rever-
sion; provided, however, that should the ownership of such land pass into private
hands, the prescription of non-use provided by R.C.C. Arts. 789 and 8546 shall
apply as in the usual case.
Section 2. All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed,
provided, however, that if this act is declared unconstitutional, in whole or in
part, the rights of all parties affected by any such decision shall be determined in
accordance with the laws in force and effect prior to the time that this act takes
effect.
33. 1960 La. Acts, No. 528, § 1.
34. 216 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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before the ten year prescriptive period had accrued. While the
terms of the Act were fairly inclusive, conceivably some state agen-
cies were not included by the 1960 revision; nor has any case ever
ruled on whether the Act applied to the state itself though the state
was probably covered.
Section 5806 of Title 9 as amended in 1960 had two paragraphs:
paragraph A purported to deal with mineral reservations in acquisi-
tions by the federal government, while paragraph B purported to
deal with the same reservations in acquisitions by the state govern-
ment. Paragraph B provided that when the state sold the property
back into private ownership, prescription would begin to run.5 Neither
the 1938 nor the 1940 Acts had such a provision despite the question-
able effect on an imprescriptible mineral interest of a sale back into
private ownership. The inclusion of this provision in paragraph B
relative to properties acquired by state agencies allows the argu-
ment to be made that, in the case of acquisitions by the federal
government controlled by paragraph A, which has no similar provi-
sion, liberative prescription will not apply when the land passes
back into private hands."' This result follows from the maxim in-
clusio unius est exclusio alterius; i.e., inclusion of one is deemed to
be the exclusion of others. However, this approach has the un-
precedented result of placing both the imprescriptible mineral in-
terest and the land title in private hands (perhaps different hands), a
result that would be contrary to public policy. Whether the legisla-
ture intended this result is doubtful, although such a result is obvi-
ously a possibility."
Paragraph B of section 5806 also provided that where the land
owner sells property to a state agency subject to a prior outstanding
mineral interest, the outstanding interest would still be subject to
prescription for non-use. However, upon the accrual of prescription,
the outstanding mineral interest would revert, not back to the state
agency, but back to the land owner from whom the agency acquired
the property. This paragraph created what was essentially a
legislatively sanctioned dealing in a reversionary interest; a unique
kind of interest which, as a general rule, was outlawed in Hicks v.
Clark." Paragraph A of this section had no such provision and, in-
deed, has been interpreted differently. In Franks Petroleum v. Mar-
35. LA. R.S. 9:58060(B (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1974 La. Acts, No. 50,
§ 3).
36. Currier, supra note 12, at 56.
37. Id.
38. 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
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tin," the court held that where property was expropriated by the
federal government subject to an outstanding mineral reservation,
"under the unmistakable terms of the statute... " the outstanding
mineral interest was imprescriptible and did not revert to the land-
owner at the time of the government's acquisition.' Thus, acquisi-
tions by the federal government have been treated differently from
acquisitions by a state agency.
On January 1, 1975, the Louisiana Mineral Code became effec-
tive.' The Mineral Code repealed all prior statutes relating to im-
prescriptibility12 and replaced them with articles 149, 150 and 151."
Article 149 originally provided that the prescription of non-use
would not run against mineral interests reserved in acquisitions by
the state or federal governments. 4 The Louisiana legislature subse-
quently enacted Acts 348 and 371 of 1980; both acts amended and re-
enacted article 149. Louisiana now seems to have two articles 149.
This situation presents problems because the articles are substan-
tially different.
Both of the new articles 149 include another type of entity
whose acquisitions may give rise to imprescriptible mineral in-
terests: ie., any legal entity with expropriation authority. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 19:2 defines legal entities with expropriation power
to include, inter alia, corporations created for constructing railroads,
toll roads, navigation canals, waterworks, gas pipelines, telephone
lines and power lines.'5 Often companies of this sort acquire a ser-
39. 234 So. 2d 268 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 236 So. 2d 36 (La. 1970).
40. Accord Franks Petroleum v. Hobbs, 200 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
relued. 203 So. 2d 555 (La. 1967).
41. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:1-214 (1974) (effective January 1, 1975; 1974 La.
Acts, No. 50 § 6).
42. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:2 (1974).
43. LA. R.S. 31:149, 150, 151 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
44. Mineral Code article 149 originally provided:
When land is acquired from any person by the United States or the State of Loui-
siana or any subdivision or agency of either by conventional deed or other con-
tract or by condemnation or expropriation proceedings and by the act of acquisi-
tion, order, or judgment, a mineral right otherwise subject to the prescription of
nonuse is reserved, the prescription of nonuse shall not run against the right so
long as title to the land remains in the government or any of its subdivisions or
agencies. If, however, the land, or any part thereof, is transferred by the govern-
ment or subdivision or agency to a private owner, the prescription of nonuse shall
apply as in the usual case but shall commence only from the date on which the act
of acquisition by the private owner is filed for registry.
45. LA. R.S. 19:2 (Supp. 1974 & 1977) provides:
Where a price cannot be agreed upon with the owner, any of the following may
expropriate needed property:
[Vol. 42
1981] IMPRESCRIPTIBLE MINERAL INTERESTS 133
vitude or right of use which, since these interests do not involve full
title to the land, will not bring into existence an imprescriptible
mineral interest." Nonetheless, future acquisitions by these entities
(1) The state or its political corporations or subdivisions created for the purpose
of exercising any state governmental powers;
(2) Any domestic or foreign corporation created for the construction of railroads,
toll roads, or navigation canals;
(3) Any domestic corporation created for the construction and operation of street
railways, urban railways, or inter-urban railways;
(4) Any domestic or foreign corporation created for the construction or operation
of waterworks, filtration and treating plants, or sewerage plants to supply the
public with water and sewerage;
(5) Any domestic or foreign corporation created for the piping and marketing of
natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public with natural gas or any part-
nership, which is or will be a natural gas company or an intra-state natural gas
transporter as defined by federal or state law, composed entirely of such corpora-
tion or composed of the wholly owned subsidiaries of such corporations.
(6) Any domestic or foreign corporation created for the purpose of transmitting
intelligence by telegraph or telephone;
(7) Any domestic or foreign corporation created for the purpose of generating,
transmitting and distributing electricity and steam for power, lighting, heating, or
other such uses. The generating plants, buildings, transmission lines, stations, and
substations expropriated or for which property was expropriated shall be so
located, constructed, operated, and maintained as not to be dangerous to persons
or property nor interfere with the use of the wires of other wire using companies
or, more than is necessary, with the convenience of the landowners;
(8) All persons included in the definition of common carrier pipelines as set forth
in R.S. 45:251;
(9) Any domestic or foreign corporations created for piping and marketing of
coal or lignite in whatever form or mixture convenient for transportation within a
pipeline as otherwise provided for in R.S. 30:721 through 30:723.
46. Louisiana expropriation laws authorize the taking of full title to the land if
necessary for public purposes. Older cases suggest that if a servitude or right-of-way
will suffice to meet the public need, the full title may not be taken. See, e.g., New
Orleans Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gray. 32 La. Ann. 471 (1880). There the court wrote:
"It is manifest that if it were a canal that was to be dug, it would require the fee,
while if a turnpike or plank-road for temporary purposes was to be constructed, a
simple temporary right of way would be all that could be required."
Id. at 476. More recently, in Greater Baton Rouge Port Commn v. Watson, 224 La.
136, 68 So. 2d 901 (1953), the court held:
"A public body possessed of the power of eminent domain has the right to acquire
property in fee title where public ir.lprovements to be erected thereon are perma-
nent In nature and are to be used in perpetuity."
I& at 902. See also La. Elec. Co. v. Covington & St. Tammany Land & Improvement
Co., 131 So. 2d 369 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) (an expropriating authority may not be re
quired to take fee title when a servitude is all that is necessary in the exercise of the
purpose or function for which the taking is authorized).
When land is expropriated and when it would not interfere with the purpose of the
taking, the owner has the option either to reserve the minerals or to require the ex-
propriating authority to compensate him for them.
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could increase the number of imprescriptible mineral interests. Here
again, a question of retroactivity arises.
Article 149 as amended by Act 371 of 1980 has another new
twist not found in article 149 as amended by Act 348 of 1980. Article
149 as embodied in Act 371 provides that before the state or federal
government or any legal entity with expropriation authority may
transfer the property to a third person, that entity must first offer
to sell the property back to the original grantor. Act 371, in addition
to amending article 149, enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes 41:1338
which provides that before the state may transfer any property to a
third person, the state must first offer to sell the property back to
the original grantor. Two important things to note about Revised
Statutes 41:1338 are (1) the statute is applicable to all property in
general irrespective of whether the property is burdened by an im-
prescriptible mineral interest, and (2) the statute does not apply to
the federal government or any non-governmental legal entity with
expropriation authority. Article 149 as embodied in Act.348 does not
require the government or other expropriating body to give the
grantor a right of first refusal. Revised Statute 41:1338 applied in
conjunction with Act 348 would require only the state or its agen-
cies to give the grantor a right of first refusal. On the other hand,
article 149 as embodied in Act 371 would not only require the state,
but also the federal government and any legal entity with expropria-
tion authority to give the grantor/owner of an imprescriptible mineral
interest a right of first refusal. Whether the federal government or
other non-governmental expropriating body must give a right of
first refusal to the grantor/owner of an imprescriptible mineral ser-
vitude seems unclear. If the right of refusal must be given, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution may be violated in not giving
this right of refusal to the grantor who does not reserve the mineral
rights. Legislative reform is needed here. However, unless such
legislation may be applied retroactively, this question might be asked
in litigation: Will the real article 149 please stand up?
Article 150 changes the law with respect to acquisitions made
by the federal government by legislatively overruling the Franks
Petroleum decision. Under this article, prescription will continue to
run against an outstanding mineral interest on land acquired either
by the federal or state government and will accrue in favor of the
owner from whom the land was acquired. Again the question of re-
troactivity arises, and Louisiana has no jurisprudence on the point.
Retroactive application of article 150 to a sale in 1960, made subject
to an outstanding mineral interest to a federal agency would seem
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to have the effect of transferring ownership of the mineral interest
from the previous owner to the owner of the land at the time of the
agency's acquisition.
Finally, article 151 of the Mineral Code provides that a mineral
interest which is outstanding at the time lands were acquired by the
government will, upon the accrual of prescription, revert to the land
owners who owned the property at the time of the government's ac-
quisition only if the property subject to the mineral interest is still
owned by the government at the time the outstanding interest pre-
scribes. If at the time prescription accrued, the land had been trans-
ferred back into private ownership, the private owner of the land at
the time that prescription accrued would get the benefit of the ex-
piration of the previously created mineral interest.
These articles of the Mineral Code attempt to answer some of
the questions which arose under prior statutes. In GMB Gas Corp. v.
Cox"' the second circuit held that the Mineral Code is to be retro-
actively applied where the particular issue has not been clearly
resolved to the contrary by litigation. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has noted this proposition but has not affirmed or denied it." Hope-
fully, the Mineral Code may be used to resolve some of the unan-
swered questions raised by prior statutes.
Some specific questions are raised by considering the creation
and conveyance of imprescriptible mineral reservations. For in-
stance, if a landowner conveys land that is subject to an outstanding
mineral servitude to a public body, and fails to reserve or convey
subject to said outstanding mineral servitude, do the minerals re-
vert to the landowner or to the public body at the end of the ten
year prescriptive period? The acquisition of land by the government
during any of the time periods discussed above would not automati-
cally create any imprescriptible mineral rights; the Acts are only ap-
plicable to acquisitions explicitly made subject to an outstanding
mineral interest or in which an explicit reservation of mineral inter-
ests is made. Without such a reservation, the minerals will simply
revert to the expropriating body which owns the land.
Another interesting question concerns the consequences of a
conveyance of an imprescriptible mineral interest. If a landowner
conveys to a third party minerals that the landowner had previously
reserved in a conveyance to a public body, are such minerals impre-
47. 340 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
48. See The Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison - So. 2d - (La. 1981).
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scriptible in the third party, or do the minerals revert to the land-
owner after the running of prescription? The creation of a term of
use in favor of a third party would not violate public policy, but
what if the act of conveyance is silent on this point? This question is
difficult to answer because of competing principles of public policy.
An argument could be made that the interest should remain im-
prescriptible in the hands of the third party if the act of conveyance
contains no language limiting or restricting the mineral interest con-
veyed to a specific term. Furthermore, if the initially reserving land-
owner were permitted to reacquire the minerals after the ten years,
he would in effect be allowed to deal in reversionary interests out-
side the purview of the pertinent statutes and contrary to the public
policy rationale of Hicks v. Clark. The competing argument is that
the pertinent statutes were designed to favor the landowner who
made the initial transfer to the government and that a third party
should not be able to benefit from the imprescriptibility statute
which is contrary to the basic public policy favoring extinguishment
of dismembered mineral rights absent use. Note, however, that in
the question posed the reversion would operate in favor of the in-
itial landowner and not in favor of the present owner, the govern-
ment. Courts should be inclined to treat the interest as imprescripti-
ble for all purposes, regardless of who is the owner, so long as title
to the surface remained in the government. If the government sold
the land subject to the outstanding interest, prescription should run
as in the normal case as provided in article 149 of the Mineral Code
and should accrue in favor of the new private owner, who could, of
course, be the party who made the initial transfer to the govern-
ment.
Finally, the effect of the after-acquired title doctrine on the
oversale of an imprescriptible mineral interest must be considered."
A prime example would be the case of a landowner who conveys
land subject to an outstanding mineral servitude to a public body,
reserving all minerals and/or conveying subject to the servitude. If
the landowner then conveys the minerals (which he does not own) to
a third party, do the minerals become vested in the third party at
the end of the ten year prescriptive period under the after-acquired
title doctrine and remain imprescriptible in the third party? A court
might not allow the initial landowner to sell his interest in the
49. The after-acquired title doctrine provides that where one sells the property of
another and later acquires title to the property sold by him, the title vests immediately
in his vendee. See, e.g., St. Landry Oil & Gas Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 2d
(1928).
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statutorily created reversionary rights which are basically at odds
with the public policy rationale of Hicks v. Clark. An argument
could be made, however, that this property right, created by ex-
press statute, should be treated as any other item of commerce in
which event the right to the reversion could be sold to a third party.
The issue is also affected by article 78 of the Mineral Code, which
deals with the sale of more minerals than the vendor owns. Article
78 provides that in the case of an oversale of minerals, the over-
buyer has ten years from the date of his deed of acquisition, or the
remaining prescriptive period of the right acquired by his oversel-
ling grantor, whichever is greater, in which to use the interest sold.
In this case the overbuyer might argue that the greater period is
the infinite prescriptive period of the overseller and therefore the
minerals are imprescriptible in the overbuyer. However, article 78
clearly does not envision this factual situation and the courts are not
likely to give the overbuyer the benefit of acquiring an imprescrip-
tible servitude. At best, the overbuyer may have ten years from the
date of his acquisition in which to exercise his rights.
NON-ALIENATION OF STATE-OWNED MINERALS
The second way in which imprescriptible mineral rights are
created is by the sale of state-owned property. The Louisiana Con-
stitution of 1921 prohibited the alienation of mineral rights owned
by the state. Article 4, section 2 of the 1921 constitution provided in
pertinent part: "In all cases the mineral rights on any and all prop-
erty sold by the State shall be reserved, except where the owner or
other person having the right to redeem may buy or redeem property
sold or adjudicated to the State for taxes ...... This provision of the
1921 constitution changed the law and was not given retroactive ef-
fect."
A corollary to the prohibition of alienation of state-owned
minerals is that prescription does not run against state-owned
mineral rights. In Shell Oil Company v. Board of Commissioners of
Pontchartrain Levee District," the appellants contended that they
acquired the mineral rights to the subject property by acquisitive
prescription of ten years. In rejecting this contention the court of
appeal held:
50. Haas v. Board of Comm'rs of Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou Boeuf Levee
Dist., 206 La. 878, 19 So. 2d 173 (1944); Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Board of
Comm'rs of Atachafalaya Basin Levee Dist., 200 La. 1049, 9 So. 2d 409 (1942); Board of
Comm'ra of Tensas Levee Dist. v. Earle, 169 La. 565, 125 So. 619 (1929).
51. 336 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 388 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1976).
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With respect to this contention we must hold that the sub-
ject Constitutional prohibition against the alienation of minerals
by the state equally prohibits the acquisition of these minerals
by others by the running of prescription against the state. Not-
withstanding the fact.that the Legislature has on numerous oc-
casions provided for the running of prescription against the
state, these statutes can not be construed to include mineral
rights for neither the Legislature nor the courts can permit
what the Constitution itself prohibits."
Article 9, section 4 of the 1974 constitution expressly provides that
prescription shall not run against the state, school board, or levee
district. This provision was merely a codification of existing juris-
prudence."
Article 4, section 2 of the 1921 constitution prohibited the "state"
from alienating minerals.5 ' This wording raised the question of
whether the prohibition also applied to state agencies. In Stokes v.
Harrison," the Louisiana Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Hamlin, held that a school board, despite being an agency of the
state, was not the "state" within the meaning of article 4, section 2
and could, therefore, alienate minerals. In a concurring opinion in
Rycade Oil Corporation v. Board of Commissioners," Judge Tate
opined that what the supreme court meant to say in Stokes is that
the term "state" does not refer to a purely local subdivision such as
a school board, but does encompass an arm of the executive branch
such as a levee district. In Shell Oil Co. v. Board of Commissioners,"
the first circuit was called upon to decide whether a levee district
was the "state" within the meaning of article 4, section 2. The court
distinguished Stokes, employing the rationale suggested by Judge
Tate in Rycade, and held that a levee district was incapable of
alienating minerals by virtue of the 1921 constitution. In Dynamic
Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc,u the supreme court, in a brief opinion
citing Shell, affirmed a decision of the First Circuit Court of Ap-
52. 336 So. 2d at 254 (emphasis supplied).
53. See Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 362 So. 2d 734 (La. 1978) (which
held that the 1921 constitutional prohibition of alienation of mineral rights barred
divestiture through acquisitive prescription) (citing Shell Oil, id). See generally Board
of Comm'rs of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929).
54. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1921, repealed 1974).
55. 238 La. 343, 115 So. 2d 373 (1959).
56. 129 So. 2d 302, 305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
57. 338 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 338 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1976).
58. 362 So. 2d 734 (La. 1978).
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peal holding that a levee district was the "state" within the mean-
ing of article 4, section 2 of the 1921 constitution. The court noted
that the 1974 constitution overruled Stokes by providing that a
school board cannot alienate minerals.5
CONCLUSION
In short, there are two types of imprescriptible mineral interests:
Those that are privately owned and those that are owned by the
state and its agencies. Imprescriptible mineral interests have been
susceptible of private ownership since 1938; minerals owned by the
state have been imprescriptible since 1921. No particular language
is necessary for the state to reserve an imprescriptible mineral
right as the state is incapable of alienating minerals. On the other
hand, privately owned imprescriptible mineral interests may be cre-
ated only by explicit reservations in sales to government bodies or
other legal entities with expropriation power. Because prescriptive
statutes are remedial, the practitioner should be aware of the retro-
active impact of the enactment, amendment or repeal of acts dealing
with the period of prescription of mineral interests. Finally, legisla-
tive reform is needed (a) to take care of the problem created by
having two Mineral Code articles 149,60 and (b) to clarify to what ex-
tent privately owned imprescriptible mineral interests may be con-
veyed. These remarks have by no means exhausted the potential
problems that imprescriptible mineral interests create. The author
has tried instead to simply illuminate some of the major areas where
a practitioner may have difficulty.
59. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 4, provides:
Section 4. (A) Reservation of Mineral Rights. The mineral rights on property
sold by the state shall be reserved, except when the owner or person having the
right to redeem buys or redeems property sold or adjudicated to the state for
taxes.
(B) Prescription. Lands and mineral interests of the state, of a school board, or
of a levee district shall not be lost by prescription.
60. House Bill No. 907 and Senate Bill 496 presently under consideration by the
Louisiana legislature would eliminate Mineral Code article 149 as embodied by Act 371
of 1980.
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